At the center of terrorism, on the level of ideas, is a classification. The terrorist is the person beyond humanity, beyond the law, and beyond reason. S/he has crossed the threshold. In the US War on Terror, for example, those charged with terrorism offenses are kept out of civilian courts, and thus the standard justice system, and instead tried in military courts, with less rights and protections. In Iraq, such trials are swift and haphazard, surrounded by uncertainty. Children are also supposed to be excluded from the adult justice system, but for their own protection, not because they’re exceptional. At the crux of these issues, the actions to weed out ISIS from Iraqi society are catching families and children in a broad net with damaging long-term consequences. Collective punishment and rushing children through the adult justice system will not achieve transitional justice.
The family members of accused ISIS fighters face a tumultuous road ahead with no clear end. Iraq has set up camps to detain returning family members of ISIS suspects, but the numbers of people being transferred and held in the camps are not clear, nor are the criteria for detention. Their long term fate is even murkier. In addition to the crime of collective punishment (i.e punishing someone because their family member was in a terrorist group) there seems to be no distinction made between children and adults. State seizure of the children from their parents is fraught with pitfalls and does not present a working alternative to detention of the entire family. How might such detention impact children? It certainly is not good for the children’s welfare, and may well traumatize them further. While easier said than done, an alternative method must be found to deal with the families of ISIS fighters.
A recent Jerusalem Post story detailed the escape of an Iraqi minor whose family died when ISIS raided their hometown several years ago. His life from age 11 until age 16 was lived under ISIS rule. In the best case scenario, he can be reunited with extended family members in Iraq, but he will need years of help to deal with the trauma he experienced. So far, he seems to have avoided accusations of having fought for ISIS, but many other children deal with these accusations today.
Indeed, Iraqi and KRG authorities are detaining and in some cases torturing children whom they allege to have been ISIS fighters. Even once released from custody, these youth have said they fear returning to their homes because of the possibility of further scapegoating as being tied to ISIS, or potentially being re-arrested. Some of the children are foreigners, but many are Iraqis; HRW estimates that around 1,500 children remain in detention for alleged connections to ISIS. A comprehensive system needs to be put in place to handle youth caught up in the war or with ISIS. If they fought as child soldiers, their age makes them victims under international law and they should not be prosecuted as terrorists. A haphazard approach to the fight to stabilize Iraq and vanquish ISIS risks planting the seeds of yet more problems in the future. The UN writes in detail here about what’s at stake with regard to the reintegration of child soldiers into society:
“Providing reintegration opportunities for children affected by conflict is not only a moral and legal obligation to protect children and put their best interests first, but it is also an important pillar to create sustainable peace. Failing to follow this trauma with healing and helping services will result in negative long-term effects for these children and their communities, and will have broader impacts on economic development and social cohesion. Stigmatization of the returning children may also lead to further exclusion and violence when programmes are not well adapted to the communities, the context and to the children’s needs.”
Understandably, some Iraqis have no patience for concerns about how suspected ISIS fighters or their families are treated given the atrocities Iraq suffered through. A strong desire for vengeance against ISIS animates haste and fuels retribution in some cases, but Iraqi authorities must keep their eyes on a key long term question, namely how to reintegrate these family members and children. In the process of putting this blog together, I found photos labeled to be the children of ISIS fighters in which their faces were recognizable; I chose not to use these photos because I cannot authenticate them nor should the children’s faces be visible even if they are genuinely children of ISIS fighters. How might such photos impact their future? The children of ISIS fighters must not be punished for their parents’ deeds, assuming their parents are actually guilty of being ISIS members. Those who fought as child soldiers need help to see the error of their ways and help with reintegration into Iraqi society. They cannot be expelled (who will take them?) or locked up forever.
The children pictured above are Iraqi children playing at school, nothing more and nothing less.
In the twilight of the failing and ongoing War on Terror, legal questions surrounding Daesh militants and those accused of aiding the group remain fraught. I previously wrote about informal tribunals in Iraq being used to deal with accused Daesh fighters, highlighting the deeply questionable practices being employed. I wrote a second piece at Medium.com exploring different instances of the same troubling phenomena. More recently, Human Rights Watch (HRW) raised questions about cases where Iraqi forces were accused of human rights violations in dealing with accused Daesh fighters. HRW angered people with its defense of what many perceived to be the indefensible, prompting some to call the organization “Daesh Rights Watch.” The case I will detail below raises questions about the nature of “enemy combatant” status, the relationship between US courts and US citizens, and finally about negotiated leniency in sentencing for jihadis to facilitate both defection from jihadi groups and the fight against radicalization.
A recent story about the ACLU suing the DOJ on behalf of a Daesh member caught my eye. However, that is the tail end of the story. The story began when a US citizen was seized and handed over to US forces in Syria by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The name of the US citizen in question has not been released, and he was being held without access to a lawyer as an “enemy combatant.” He apparently holds a second citizenship, which has not been specified. Several months ago, when the Washington Post reported on this case, they reported that USDOJ officials did not believe they had enough evidence to charge him and that he was being held in a “short-term facility” in Iraq. Why had he been given the “enemy combatant” distinction? The vague details of the case leave too many such questions open. This is when the ACLU sued the US government on this man’s behalf and a judge agreed, saying that the detainee could not be denied access to a lawyer. Hanging over all of this was the fact that the unnamed detainee was the first such capture since Donald Trump entered office as the POTUS.
screenshot of Mohamad Khweis from Kurdistan24.net
A different case that made headlines can help illuminate a different angle of issues surrounding Daesh and “enemy combatant” distinctions. Mohamad Khweis was tried for having joined ISIS before fleeing of his own accord. Khweis turned himself over to Kurdish forces and was brought back to the United States to face trial. Khweis claims to have not participated in any violence but prosecutors found this dubious. The judge ultimately believed him, stating that he (the judge) “…believe(d) you left because you became disillusioned…you didn’t kill anyone… you left of your own volition.” Khweis was sentenced to twenty years in prison, a sentence around which there was no agreement. His defense attorneys asked for five years, while prosecutors pushed for thirty-five years, saying that Khweis had lied repeatedly and that he did not show true remorse for his actions.
Khweis’ case displays the governmental and judicial transparency that should accompany any case, while the aforementioned case of the unnamed “enemy combatant” begs the question: what was the nature of the evidence for classifying this man as an enemy combatant? The secrecy clouds the distinction and makes one wonder, is it all happening again? Could an innocent man have been railroaded by a justice system rigged against him if the ACLU hadn’t intervened?
One person who helped answer this question wasSeamus Hughes, a fellow at the George Washington University Program on Extremism (GWPoE) who follows US court cases involving Daesh closely. He explained that some accused jihadis have been declared “enemy combatants” after capture before having that distinction removed so a civilian trial could proceed. To his knowledge, this is the first case he has seen where the state did not drop the “enemy combatant” distinction.
Spencer Ackerman raised a related question: shouldn’t governments be trying to encourage Daesh members to defect, and does this “enemy combatant” distinction for someone with apparently little evidence against him undercut that? Defectors are perceived to be weapons in the fight against radicalization domestically but if these defectors are thrown in jail with no remorse, what incentive do they have to cooperate? Such choices would force defectors underground, a situation that does not help them or governments in their fight against Daesh.
There are few easy answers to the fight against Daesh which tests legal systems where ever it is fought. The desire to label jihadis as exceptional, sub-human, lacking basic rights tests human nature and our belief in the power of human rights. Even those whom we despise and are guilty of awful crimes must be protected by basic human rights for the concept to be of value. Onur Bakiner emphasized this to me through an historical example. Onur is a political scientist at Seattle University who studies courts and their politics in Latin America as well as Turkey. He discussed how the spirit of the Nuremberg Trials at the end of WWII showed the value of due process guarantees for war criminals. Allied forces could have executed the captured war criminals, but chose instead to put them on trial.
This lesson of the Nuremberg Trials is one that key people in the US government forgot or deemed outdated. The US showed over the last two decades in its “War on Terror” that it would detain and torture anyone the system deemed a combatant. The US scooped under hundreds of innocent people, and more than 700 of those who were detained at Guantanamo were eventually released. While most cases for American Daesh fighters are apparently being resolved in civilian courts, the case detailed here of the unnamed combatant represents a serious step backward for the USDOJ which seems to coincide with Donald Trump’s presidency and Jeff Sessions’ time running the USDOJ. Mohamad Khweis’ case, detailed above, shows us that trials for Daesh members in civilian courts are not only possible, but the best path. If the US continues to declare fighters to be “enemy combatants” while denying them basic due process in a court of law, this will not help defeat Daesh, but it will ensnare innocent people.
I wrote a piece arguing that gender, specifically toxic masculinity, needs to be taken into account when we study radicalization for jihadis. It was published by The Islamic Monthly and can be found here.
Early on the morning of 7 June 2017, Tehran was rocked by news of an attack at the Iranian Parliament building. Soon, separate reports came in of an attack carried out at Khomeini’s shrine some distance away, as well as in a metro station in another district of Tehran. It became all too clear that these terrorist attacks were coordinated, but it remained unclear who was responsible. As often happens- the last report turned out to be false, the attacks were concentrated in the first two sites, with six total attackers, one woman and five men.
I logged off twitter, as it was late at night in Seattle, only recently having seen the first strange reports of Daesh claiming responsibility. They were strange because they didn’t take the normal form we’ve come to associate with Daesh media, but by the time I woke up the next morning in Seattle no doubt remained. Daesh claimed the attacks clearly through their official media channels, and the Iranian government confirmed the attackers were indeed from Iran. With those facts laid out, the gravity of the attack was confirmed: Daesh had carried out its first large coordinated terrorist attack in predominantly Shi’ite Iran.
While largely surprising, those following Daesh and their media closely had seen indications for some time that the organization has been attempting to reach Sunni Muslims inside Iran. A good report about the Persian language Daesh video can be found here. Another good report that details Daesh’s growing propaganda in the weeks leading up to to today’s attacks can be found here; it appeared before the attack. Not content to let media outlets report on the Tehran attack, Daesh uploaded video to their Telegram channel as it was happening, apparently the first time they’ve done this since an attack in Bangladesh (h/t Rukmini Callimachi).
When the attack was finally over, at least 12 people were dead and 46 more were injured. The IRGC, or the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, were quick to blame Saudi Arabia for the attack but have not provided any proof for this allegation. While the identities of the attackers remain unknown, it fits with a “truth” many have already accepted, that Daesh is at least funded, if not actively supported by the Saudi state. I would urge extreme caution in making these kinds of claims, not because I want to defend the Saudis, and certainly not because I have an agenda. I take very seriously claims of fact and use of evidence; I haven’t seen conclusive proof these allegations are true.
Significantly to the west, another event passed largely unnoticed in international media. A Daesh attack in a Shiite neighborhood in Beirut was foiled by Lebanese security services. Thankfully they weren’t successful, but it wasn’t the first time- Daesh bombed Dahiyeh in late 2015. When I saw this, a day before the Tehran attacks, I thought to myself, ‘they’re really trying to start a larger sectarian war.’ Lebanon has so far avoided slipping into an abyss of sectarian violence, now 27 years after the end of its own civil war, but Daesh clearly wants to rip that open.
The Overarching Questions: Why Iran, Why now?
It’s not Saudi Arabia; It’s not the Qatar Crisis; It’s not Trump’s recent visit. Instead, the answer here begins with major territorial losses for Daesh in Iraq and Syria. Mosul is almost completely liberated from ISIS after months of painful and bloody siege. Not only does Daesh have to deal with the materials losses- death, lost territory, less seized resources- but it loses momentum, arguably the most important part of the group’s success. As we have seen since the group’s shocking seizure of Mosul in the summer of 2014, victories not only win spoils like weapons, new oil fields, bases, etc but they also serve to attract more recruits. Daesh needs war to legitimate itself (in the eyes of its followers), to achieve its genocidal aims, and to keep its flows of recruits coming.
Thus the context Daesh finds itself in is more than sufficient to explain their choice to attack Iran now. As Daesh is really on the ropes, what I see is that Daesh wants to start a much larger regional conflagration. When I saw the news about the Tehran attacks, I immediately thought back to the story about the foiled attack I’d seen barely 24 hours earlier about Beirut. This strategy of attacking Beirut and Iran and trying to draw all Shiites into war with Daesh is like the one pursued by Zarqawi (arguably the founder of Daesh), targeting the Golden Mosque in Samarra. Igniting a larger war would potentially benefit Daesh in multiple ways:
Relieve pressure on Raqqa and Mosul by drawing new actors into the war, if it spread to Lebanon/ parts of Iran and or drew Hizbullah deeper into confrontation with Daesh
This would create “momentum” for the group, news of successful attacks is sadly red meat for their base.
Momentum would translate into increased numbers of recruits as it did earlier, especially if Daesh can convince more that Shiites need to be targeted and killed
In conclusion, parts of the Middle East that are currently not engaged in the war engulfing Syria and Iraq are sadly ripe for sectarian provocation. They haven’t always been this way- barely 50 years ago the region’s political spheres were still dominated by political ideologies like Arab Nationalism and Communism. Those ideologies are largely if not completely gone and sectarianism has been a daily reality since 2003, with longer roots stretching back before that. Daesh’s attempts to throw gasoline on a fire that is relatively shrinking if still not extinguished must not be allowed to ignite the larger regional conflagration the group wants. Unfortunately, as many have pointed out, the GCC’s blockade of Qatar is basically a casus belli, and today news came that Turkey is sending troops to Qatar. May this all pass and cooler heads prevail, otherwise Daesh will likely be the “winner” and get what it wants: more bloodshed.
This article uses publicly available evidence from 2003-2010 to explore the accusation that Bashar al Assad and the Syrian government deliberately supported Al-Qaeda jihadis in Syria so they could carry out attacks in Iraq. As these years were the formative ones for ISIS, then known by a series of different names, the evidence strongly, but not conclusively, points to Syria having helped ISIS form. There is no evidence that Syria intended for the jihadi group to grow into what it has become, but rather that Syria seems to have supported it for short-term, strategic ends.
Late last fall, a series was released by the Daily Beast about Bashar Al-Assad and his government’s supposed role in the formation of ISIS. Part One explored how the regime facilitated jihadis in Syria from 2000-2010 by letting them base themselves in Syria. Part Two details how a series of bombings in Damascus in late 2011 and early 2012 when the uprisings in Syria were really gaining steam were actually carried out by the Assad regime and blamed on Al-Qaeda. The defectors interviewed claim this was done to sectarianize the uprising and provide support for Assad’s discourse that he was fighting terror and needed Western support doing this. Part Three explores all the instances on the battlefield in Syria where the regime supposedly avoided clashing with ISIS. The claims in the series, especially those in part one, have been present in pubic discourse for some time and were expressed in a more detailed form with citations by Charles Lister in his “The Syrian Jihad“. Can the claims that come from defectors and anti-regime rebels be corroborated in these other sources? What kinds of sources do these other works use and can they help us triangulate the issues?
I won’t go into the backgrounds of each author- Lister and Gutman- readers can do that for themselves and decide for themselves if they think the background/employer is relevant here. From my point of view, news organizations certainly develop or lose credibility over time but a serious critique of the piece can’t stop at reputation, it has to look at the sources. I will go through Lister’s sources and other publicly available sources, to see if they correspond here with what defectors claim, and if this story holds water. Let’s look at the news sources in particular- as I am going through Lister’s sources and following where the trail leads, this will only be roughly chronological, while primarily following the sources.
DIGGING INTO THE SOURCES (2003-2004)
The first source, Ghaith Abdel Ahad in the Washington Post (6/5/04) interviews a Syrian man, Abu Ibrahim, about his work helping fighters move out of Syria into Iraq to fight against US forces. The story here, cited by Lister, a full seven years before the beginning of uprisings in Syria, is almost identical to what the Daily Beast recounts. His own story of radicalization, interestingly, comes from 7 years in Saudi Arabia, exposure to Wahhabism, and finding a welcome community around Abu Qaqaa back in Aleppo upon his return. Qaqaa, in both the Daily Beast and Lister accounts, was the central figure in Aleppo quietly sponsored by the Syrian government. The rest of the piece is very good, but too long to recount here, read it for yourselves.
Another source Lister cites is “Syria’s Proxy Forces in Iraq” by Ziad K. Abdelnour (April 2003). Mr. Abdelnour has citations of his own, and they aren’t identical to those above. His account of the problems again mirrors the Daily beast and Lister, and like the latter, he connects the mobilization of jihadis to Ain al-Hilweh, the Palestinian refugee camp in southern Lebanon. He compares Assad’s role in this mobilization to Hafez Al-Assad’s “war by proxy” against US and European peacekeepers in Lebanon in the early 1980s. These are the citations at the bottom of his piece, most of which cannot be easily followed as they lack the title or author and the links only go back up in the document (what’s up with that, MEI?):
That means most of Adbdelnour’s claims should not be accepted unless they can be corroborated by other sources. To follow the one branch I could from Abdelnour’s citations, I found no.10, “Arab Neighbors Queue for ticket to Martyrdom” (4/1/03), the author of which remained anonymous. It discusses how not only Syrians crossed into Iraq to fight from Syria, but that many other Arabs of various nationalities would first travel to Syria and then cross into Iraq on busses. Egypt attempted to stop its citizens from traveling to Iraq, but “[D]espite the restrictions, bus-loads of people are leaving each night from outside the Iraqi embassy in Damascus bound for Baghdad.” This piece never connects these events to Bashar al-Assad, but neutrally reports their existence independent of any accusations against Assad. After reading it one gets the impression the Syrian government was doing almost nothing to stop the phenomenon.
A bit of digging through my university’s catalogs found access to this LATimes article, “Probe Links Syria, Terror Network; Italian investigation finds the country was a hub for shuttling money and recruits to Iraq” (16 April 2003, A1) by Sebastian Rotella. I was not able to find it through a simple google search as I did with the others above. The details here give a new, robust base to the claims: Italian courts investigated the issues and found a man named Mullah Fuad, a Kurdish leader, was responsible for shuttling fighters from Syria to Iraq. This came to the attention of Italian authorities because of ongoing contact Fuad had with suspects in Italy he was trying to get to come fight. As I can’t link to the text, I took a screenshot of the abstract and header here with the url visible so any doubts about where I got it from can be addressed:
Between these first four sources, we see a broad base of different publications, each sketching out their own version of events that highly overlap with different sources. The trademarks of coordination, especially direct repetition of talking points, are not here. Readers can ultimately judge for themselves. A fifth, which I found in my own digging that isn’t cited by either Lister or Gutman is this cable from Wikileaks(3/20/03). It details how Syria closed its border with Iraq once the war started and set up camps to help refugees. It shows clearly that Syria was conscious of the border issue and at least attempted to close it. If Syria knew about this earlier and the issues continued, it supports the accusations but doesn’t prove them.
DIGGING INTO THE SOURCES (2007-2010)
The claims that Al-Qaeda was operating out of Syria to carry out attacks in Iraq are present again years later, in completely different publications. News of an Al-Qaeda in Iraq operative killed in a raid on the Syrian side of the border raised eyebrows and was detailed in “Al Qaeda in Iraq operative killed near Syrian Border Sheds light on foreign influence.” (10/03/07). “Muthanna” as he was known was apparently Al-Qaeda’s Emir of the Syria/Iraq border area. As Bill Rogio, the author, writes:
The idea that an Al-Qaeda operative would have to enroll in a security course in Syria raises the question- if this was happening in Syria, how could Assad’s government not know about it? Almost a year after Muthanna’s death, another raid carried out by US Special Forces in Syria apparently killed an Iraqi Al-Qaeda operative named Abu Ghadiya. Detalied in “Officials Say U.S. Killed an Iraqi in Raid in Syria,” (10/27/08) the raid happened in Sukkariyah. The NYT piece, as that paper is wont to do, cites unnamed intelligence officials in its account, so those claims should be considered dubitable for our purposes here.
Around the same time as the two aforementioned events by the Syria/Iraq border, a series of records were discovered in Sinjar, Iraq. A Christian Science Monitor report (1/08) looked at these records and cited a CTC study about them. The CTC study neatly summarized its main findings from the Sinjar Records, and was cited in the Daily Beast piece. Gutman quotes the piece, pointing out how “it is almost inconceivable that Syrian intelligence has not tried to penetrate these networks.” What Gutman didn’t quote, however, seems even stronger to this reader’s mind- that evidence in the Sinjar documents shows that Al-Qaeda fighters commonly had multiple coordinators in Syria (p. 25). The fighters were also asked to rate the trustworthiness these coordinators, which seems to imply that the Iraqis don’t trust those they are working with in Syria (p.25). The question, then, is if this lack of trust comes from them being smugglers that AQ thinks are ultimately putting profits first, or if it is potentially because they were from Syrian intelligence (or someone else?) If it wasn’t the Syrian government behind this in some form, then again, the question hangs in the air: how could the Syrian government not know and/or do nothing to stop it?
There is yet more evidence from this period about not only the flow of jihadis from Syria to Iraq but also Syria’s involvement. “Iraq’s Ho Chi Minh Trail” by James Denselow (5/15/08), does not point the finger at Assad but does engage with the issue of the Syria-Iraq border as the primary transit point for foreign fighters entering Iraq. A Reuters report (9/30/09) shows a different angle supporting the claims that Syria was involved. In “Iraq al Qaeda militant says Syria trained him“, a videotape of a man who identifies himself as Mohammad Hassan al-Shemari was at the center of a diplomatic row between Iraq and Syria. A bombing in Baghdad was blamed on Syria by the Iraqi government, and the video of al-Shemari was offered as evidence. Al-Shemari, a Saudi national, claims he was trained by Syria in camps known to Syrian intelligence. The Reuters story points out it was not possible to independently verify al-Shemari’s account, but readers can already see here how it lines up with other accounts.
Iraq continued to suffer from bombings that made the country’s leadership clash with Syria in August 2009. In early December of that same year, more bombings took place (four in one day) that killed more than 100 and injured several hundred more. This was detailed in “Baghdad Car Bombs Blamed on Syria and Islamists by Iraqi Government.” What is especially intriguing is that Maliki’s government, by this time falling out with Washington over its increasingly sectarian and authoritarian rule, leveled these accusations. The popular narrative goes that Iran supports both Assad and Maliki, but this fissure shows we can’t reduce geopolitics to clear outcomes on the ground. As mentioned earlier, the Iraqi government released the video of the Al-Qaeda militant and his testimony, but new evidence below supports the allegations.
The Iraqi government presented a dossier to the Syrians to support their allegations, and Martin Chulov the Guardian correspondent claimed to have seen it as well. The Iraqis claimed to have spied on a recent meeting where the attacks were planned, and that Syrian government figures as well as representatives from two Islamist militias were there. The blunt, startling accusation level by the Iraqis was:
“…that an unlikely co-operative of secular Ba’athists and militants who eschewed any form of government in favour of a return to Islamic law conspired from 30 July to pool their resources and wreak havoc during the pre-election period.”The Guardian, 12/8/09
If true, it resonates strongly with the form that ISIS takes years later. It also raises questions about the extent to which this was a continuation of the earlier practice of sponsoring jihadis like Abu Qaqaa or if this resembles that earlier phenomenon in form but is actually something else? So adding to the pile of evidence, Nouri al-Maliki’s government publicly accused Syria of abetting jihadis.
“Since the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, Syria has become a transit station for al Qaida foreign terrorists on their way to Iraq. Abu Ghadiyah and his network go to great lengths to facilitate the flow through Syria of money, weapons, and terrorists intent on killing U.S. and Coalition forces and innocent Iraqis.” (cited above)
This report doesn’t blame the Syrian government exactly, but again it points to events and names individuals involved. I can imagine that some will be hesitant to trust public reports from the US government, but these details are broadly corroborated in a wikileaks documentcited by both Lister and the Daily Beast. Let’s look at it next.
The document is dated 2/24/10. It details a surprise appearance by Syrian General Intelligence Director Ali Mamluk at a meeting between Syrian Vice Foreign Minister Faisal al-Miqdad and an American delegation led by S/CT Daniel Benjamin. Mamluk agrees that Syria is willing to potentially work with the US on several issues of importance, especially the Syria/Iraq border, if the US is willing to change several policies of interest to the Syrians. Later in the document, Mamluk describes Syria’s approach to terrorist groups, which is to infiltrate them rather than immediately clash with them, something Mamluk insisted had been successful. It is not only quite remarkable that Mamluk would admit this to the American delegation, but he also was willing to negotiate over the Syria/Iraq border, showing that Syria knew it could do more in this regard, and held it out to the US as a diplomatic carrot.
As readers should know, the controversy around Wikileaks focuses on what the organization decides to publish, not the veracity of the documents they publish. There is no reason to suspect that either of the documents from Wikileaks I cited in this post are not real, or that any of the documents Wikileaks has put online are not real.
Finally, the last wikileaks document (2/24/10) seems to corroborate what the Gutman piece about the Syrian government claimed, that the Syrians penetrated ISIS and have constant tabs on the organization from the inside. This is exactly how Mamluk described Syria’s policy toward jihadis.
By digging into a small sample of the publicly available evidence, a number of points become clear. First, Syria features in accounts from different years and completely different media outlets in different parts of the world as the primary country that jihadis travel to before traveling on to Iraq. This is corroborated in multiple accounts spelled out above, as well as in the Sinjar records and the raids that killed Abu Ghadiya and Muthanna. This helps establish the phenomenon as real, whether or not the Syrian state was involved. As Turkey is to the Syrian War today, Syria was to the Iraq War then.
Stepping forward from this base, numerous pieces of evidence outlined above support the central claim in both The Syrian Jihad by Charles Lister and in the Daily Beast series that Bashar al-Assad’s government sponsored and facilitated this flow of jihadis. Given the timing, location, and affiliations of these jihadis, it is possible to see this as having a significant impact on salafi-jihadi groups in Iraq right when the first iterations of ISIS were forming. The evidence thus strongly supports the conclusion that Assad had a strong hand in helping the organization grow at a key time in its timeline, rather than fighting them. I agree with Lister’s conclusion that Assad seemingly wanted to control this jihadi threat and direct it away from his regime, rather than stifling it. This also broadly lines up with part of the argument in Jean Pierre Filiu’s “From Deep State to Islamic State” that authoritarian regimes tolerated or facilitated jihadis for a variety of reasons, pointing to Syria and Yemen most primarily. I realize that the evidence here is not conclusive, I don’t claim anything else. I do, however, see it as ruling out most possibilities of doubt. It comes from too many different sources, stretched across a broad swath of time, all of which significantly predates the uprisings in Syria in early 2011.
The origins of ISIS/Daesh have been a central topic on this blog, as they have been in debates over the last two years since the group really shocked the world. There has been no shortage of half-baked ideas:
Republicans in the USA think ISIS emerged in 2011 after Obama withdrew American troops. A serious debate can be had about whether this was the right time to withdraw troops or not, but little explanation other than implied indefinite occupation is proposed as an alternative. Iraqis clearly wouldn’t accept indefinite occupation, and ISIS already existed, so the argument falls apart pretty quickly.
Donald Trump and Rudy Giuliani seem to think ISIS exists because of Iraqi oil, and that if the USA seized the oil in Iraq, ISIS could have been avoided.
Others like Jay Sekulow made empty political claims tying Hamas in Palestine to ISIS, insisting they’re one and the same, despite any supporting evidence and indeed a lot of evidence to the contrary.
David Petraeus, former director of the CIA and general in American armed forces came out recently to correct Trump, instead arguing that it was Nuri al-Maliki’s fault for alienating Iraqi Sunnis under his rule in the years after the USA overthrew Saddam Hussein. This, more than the others, has a real grain of truth to it. The problem is, well General Petraeus, how did Nuri al-Maliki come to power exactly?
By ignoring the 2003 American invasion, which all sober analysts and experts agree to be the sine qua non for the emergence of ISIS, Petraeus scores cheap political points and assuages Republican voters and many Democrats who championed the war but still struggle to acknowledge the volume of the mistake that was made- indeed the crime that was committed. The factor Petraeus points to- Maliki’s corrupt and vindictive rule from 2006 until 2014- certainly antagonized Iraqi Sunnis and exacerbated sectarian tensions but solid historical works shows that the beginnings of ISIS already existed at this time. Readers can check these well-written books on the subject of ISIS here or here or here. One certainly cannot say that Iraqi leaders have done nothing wrong and that outside forces did everything blameworthy, but neither can one seriously ignore the brutal failed invasion and the mind-numbing waves of violence it unleashed.
Finally, I previously gave a public talk at Lund University in Sweden sponsored by the Center for Middle Eastern Studies about what I called the “conditions of possibility” for the emergence of ISIS, going back to WWII to trace changing political spheres, economic trends, and rising salafi-jihadism to show that many of these trends started long before 2003, but that the American invasion ripped open the fabric of state and society to allow ISIS to grow and ultimately seize territory. The outbreak of war in Syria next door was arguably the key factor, out of Iraq or America’s control, that helped the group seize territory and grow after 2011.
Click here to see the talk and click on “DEL 2” once the link opens. Sometimes it is slow to load but be patient:)
In the last 48 hours a slightly clearer picture has started to emerge about the Russian plan which broke up in mid air and crashed, killing all aboard. The Islamic State’s extension in the Sinai- known as Wilayat Sinai- claimed responsibility but didn’t explain how they did it. This led many, including myself, to begin wondering if they had used some kind of surface-to-air missile, though that was immediately questioned by many, and their doubts seem to be correct. The plane was too high up and it’s not clear that ISIS in Sinai has any weapon that could carry out an attack like that even if the plane were at a lower altitude. It now seems there was a bomb in the cargo hold, most likely in someone’s luggage. How they got that through security is not clear. For some really good background on terrorist groups fighting the Egyptian state in the Sinai, see this great post by Ellis Goldberg.
The details of the bomb itself aside, people are coming around to the likely reality that ISIS indeed planted some kind of bomb on that plane as they claim. This new video, which I just came across on twitter not even an hour ago, explains some of their motivations. The video starts with confusion and screams from victims in what the viewer comes to figure out was a Russian air strike. A young boy’s voice shouts in distress that it’s his nephew (ibn ukhti). We see the chaotic scenes of people carrying out the dead body of someone killed in what we are to assume was the same strike. Sirens wail in the background. The graphics that interrupt the images have the words “شفاء النفوس بقتل الروس” which roughly translates to “healing souls by killing Russians”. It continues, stating that ISIS in Sinai had brought down the plane, killing the Russian “crusaders” on board. This term “صليبين”, meaning “crusaders” has also been used by Al-Qaeda and other jihadist groups in the past to refer to the United States, insomuch as they perceive the United States to be Christian. This responds to the statements of the Russian Orthodox Church, when they described the Russian airstrikes in Syria as “a holy war against terrorism“.
The video continues, describing how Russia aligned itself with Iran and “bombed the homes of Muslims” in Syria, which they undertook to “promote their interests and realize their ambitions” in Syria. In doing so they made themselves an extension of the “Nusayri” state (meaning Assad’s regime) and they killed women and children in the process. Since ISIS couldn’t just refer to Iranians, they call them “مجوس”and “روافض”, which are both sectarian insults Sunnis direct at Zoroastrians and Shiiites, respectively. They continue, making broad statements about how Russia has entered into a losing war and that they failed to heed the warnings of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
The second half of the video is a series of short statements from people on the ground speaking in support of ISIS. The congratulate their compatriots there on taking down the plane. They refer to the Russians as “cowards” for bombing from the air, and they wish for more successful strikes with the help of god against the Russians. One man, who starts speaking at 5:43, refers to the Russians as “communists” who don’t believe in god, breaking from the message of the others that the Russians are “crusaders”. He ends speaking clearly, outlining that this is the equation, or exchange- “if you kill, you will be killed. You will live in security and peace if we, Muslims, can live in security and peace.” That’s a loose translation but I am confident it expresses his intent.